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The implementation of the United Nations security council sanctions by member states has gained 
increasing importance in the sanctions debate over the past 15 years. Having remained long neglected 
in academic circles, the sanctions review process sponsored by the Swiss, German, and Swedish 
governments over the past decade has been instrumental in putting the question of implementation at 
the centre of the sanctions research agenda.1 One of the main innovations that has characterized the 
sanctions landscape in the aftermath of the Cold War is the transformation of sanctions instruments: 
the classical trade embargoes that dominated the sanctions scene for most of the 20th century have 
given way to more sophisticated and carefully crafted “targeted” measures. The establishment of 
targeted sanctions has been accompanied by other novel developments, such as the practice of 
targeting individuals rather than states. These transformations make it necessary to explore how the 
national implementation of multilateral sanctions has been affected, as well as its consequences for 
the efficacy of the measures. 
 
This article sketches the main issues surrounding the national implementation of United Nations 
sanctions. It identifies the most salient trends in the implementation of sanctions by individual states  
-- and a regional entity, namely the European Union -- and outlines how they have been affected by 
the emergence of targeted, often blacklist-based sanctions. At the same time, the analysis endeavours 
to focus on the impact that new developments have on the efficacy of the measures concerned. 
 
The article is divided into four sections. The first provides a brief introduction to the transformations 
in sanctions as a tool over the past two decades. A second section outlines conflicting trends working 
both in favour and to the detriment of sanctions implementation. The third reviews the problems 
caused by the increasing encroachment on domestic legal orders by recent sanctions regimes. A final 
section discusses the difficulties posed by the violation of standards of due process resulting from UN 
blacklists, which merits special attention as it is the source of a number of legal cases in Europe. 
 
THE UN SANCTIONS LANDSCAPE AND ITS POST-COLD WAR MUTATIONS 
 
The use of sanctions by the UN security council increased significantly in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. While the security council subjected only two countries to mandatory sanctions prior to 1989 
(Rhodesia and South Africa), Carina Staibano has counted 20 voluntary and mandatory sanctions 
regimes that were active between 1964 and 2005.2 As of the end of November 2009, there were 11 
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active sanctions regimes. UN sanctions practice has undergone a series of transformations at different 
levels. For the purpose of our analysis, the innovations introduced in UN practice can be succinctly 
summarized as follows. 
 
In the early to mid-1990s, the UN security council began to authorize sanctions to deal with internal 
armed conflict, especially in countries where state authority had collapsed, or so-called “failed states.” 
This was the case even in instances where internal conflict had limited external ramifications. From 
that point of view, the security council departed from the restrictive interpretation of what constituted 
“a threat to international peace and security” that had characterized its practice since its inception. 
Apart from expanding the range of situations that qualified for enforcement action, the security 
council also started to apply some of its sanctions regimes on only one of the parties in conflict, 
therefore manifestly taking sides. In a range of internal conflict situations such as in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Angola, the sanctions targeted rebel groups. 
Similarly, the goals of sanctions regimes expanded to cover gross human rights violations, concerns 
about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism, thus acquiring 
new roles in preserving peace and security.3 
 
Most importantly, the very instrument of sanctions was subject to a transformation. As a result of the 
loss of legitimacy generated by the public outcry over the humanitarian disaster provoked by 
comprehensive sanctions applied against Iraq, Haiti, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
security council moved away from full economic embargoes towards “smart” or targeted sanctions. A 
more sophisticated concept, targeted sanctions constitute a heterogeneous toolbox, encompassing 
commercial measures such as commodity embargoes and aviation bans, along with blacklist -based 
sanctions such as assets freezes and travel bans. Their aim is to focus the effect of sanctions on the 
individuals and elites responsible for the policies they are intended to reverse, while avoiding or at 
least minimizing damage to the civilian population and neighbouring countries. 
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, new trends in sanctions design emerged. These have subsequently been 
reinforced by the intense effort to fight international terrorism after September nth. Blacklists 
originally targeted individuals directly linked to state authorities. During the conflict that unfolded in 
the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the security council mandated the 
freezing of the assets held by the government and state-owned enterprises, along with the personal 
assets of the leading elites. The later 1990s witnessed a trend towards the application of sanctions 
against individuals unconnected to states. The financial and aviation sanctions - first threatened and 
then made mandatory - targeting the Taliban in 1999 entailed the “listing” of individuals and 
organizations suspected of conducting or lending support to terrorist activities, but without any formal 
association to state authorities.4 At that stage, there was still a link to the state of Afghanistan as the 
Taliban authorities were instructed to surrender a well-known terrorist suspect, Osama bin Laden. 
Extradition for terrorism suspects had been requested before, in the case against Libya for the its role 
in the Pan Am and UTA flight bombings in 1988 and 1989 respectively and in the case of Sudan’s 
support of the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995. Yet the 
inclusion of specific names in the body of a resolution was new. The initial list created by the 1267 
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committee and circulated via a press release featured the names of five entities and one individual, 
Mohammed Omar.5 
 
The first reference to a “consolidated list” came in March 2001 in a press release that listed the names 
of 156 individuals and 17 entities. It came to be known in the media as the “blacklist.” The September 
nth attacks in New York and Washington made the list infamous because of the increase in the 
number of names added to it. The sanctions regime has since expanded its scope beyond the territorial 
boundaries of Afghanistan. In January 2002, the security council broadened the financial, travel, and 
arms sanctions against Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Resolution 1390 extended the reach of the 
sanctions regime to address what had morphed into a global threat, with al Qaeda at its centre. 
Reflecting the universal scope of the regime, the name was changed from the Afghanistan regime to 
the 1267 regime. The global 1267 regime list is, therefore, fully disconnected from states, their 
authorities, and even their territories. As a result, the terrorist blacklist has added a new function to the 
catalogue of objectives pursued though sanctions: rather than aiming at compelling a behavioural 
change in targeted leaders, its goal is to combat terrorism by preventing suspects from travelling 
and/or financing terrorist activities.6 The targets are private persons and entities - not state leaders or 
organizations - whose place of residence remains often unknown. As of the end of September 2009, 
509 individuals and entities were on the 1267 list. 
 
To some extent, the evolution of sanctions parallels that of peacekeeping operations. As the number of 
missions increased, their mandates were gradually expanded to encompass a host of responsibilities, 
resulting in “mission creep” and leading to questions about the impartiality of the mission. Indeed, the 
concept of peacekeeping has evolved so dramatically that operations have been labelled as being of 
the first, second, or even third generation.7 The fact that both armed missions and sanctions, the 
principal enforcement measures of the UN under chapter VII of the charter, have undergone profound 
transformations in the past 15 years mirrors the UN’s creative endeavours to adapt to a new strategic 
environment, not least through its response to threats. Perhaps more conspicuously, the security 
council’s response to the emergence of international terrorism as a central item on the global security 
agenda, consisting of the blossoming of suspected terrorists’ blacklists, represents a further step away 
from the traditional employment of sanctions as a means of focusing pressure on states. The evolution 
of targeted sanctions represents a trend towards the personalization and individualization of measures 
in the field of peace and security, a development mostly visible in the rise of ad-hoc international 
tribunals to deal with war crimes such as the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda, the special tribunal for Cambodia, and the 
International Criminal Court. 
 
THE TREND TOWARDS FRAGMENTATION IN SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Targeted sanctions exacerbate the obstacles that obstruct the implementation of sanctions. In addition, 
UN targeted sanctions pose new challenges to the member states that have to implement them. One 
difficulty of a legal technical nature stems from the fact that the UN charter does not impose a 
particular model on member states for the implementation of security council resolutions. Two 
methods exist: one of them consists of the adoption of a general piece of legislation specifically 
designed to allow for the transposition of these measures into domestic legal frameworks, which 
typically takes the form of a so-called “United Nations enabling act.” The other consists of a case-by-
case transposition of resolutions into laws, a method that leaves more flexibility to the legislator as to 
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how exactly to implement the measures but has proven to be more time consuming. Prior to targeted 
sanctions, the problem of the time lag between the release of the security council resolution and the 
implementing national legislation - which sometimes amounted to as much as two or three years - 
could easily have been addressed by the adoption of pre-existing enabling legislation. However, with 
the advent of targeted sanctions, enabling legislation has become insufficient to fully cover the range 
of measures in the security council’s sanctions toolbox. As Gowlland-Debbas points out, “sanctions... 
which include specifically targeted measures, in particular financial restrictions, may require 
particularly tailored legislation directed at financial and banking operations.”8 The increasingly 
technical nature of the legislation required for implementation exacerbates the problem of the time 
lag. Even the European Union, an organization with considerable experience in the implementation of 
sanctions, needed no less than six months to pass legislation implementing sanctions against North 
Korea.9 
 
To some extent, the availability of pre-existing legislation permitting the transposition of security 
council sanctions resolutions can help speed the process in those countries that have them in place. 
What is probably most striking are cases in which the sanctions are applied by sender states, but via 
mechanisms other than the enabling legislation. A prominent illustration is the incorporation in the 
Maastricht treaty of an article specifically designed for the joint implementation of financial 
sanctions, which was not used by member states in the application of the financial measures in the 
following years.10 Instead, member states preferred to use national legislation. This is especially 
surprising in view of the fact that they had been jointly implementing economic embargoes since the 
early 1980s. Whatever considerations might have led states to refrain from using clauses, this 
phenomenon bears significant consequences for sanctions efficacy and policy coherence. 
 
Targeted sanctions are particularly complicated to apply for several reasons. The requirement to give 
effect to targeted sanctions -- far more sophisticated measures than the classical interruptions of trade 
-- translates into the need for highly trained personnel with specialized knowledge. This is particularly 
true for such measures as financial sanctions. In a number of countries, the sheer administrative 
capacity necessary to implement, monitor, and enforce the measures is insufficient or lacking. 
 
Secondly, and again in contrast to full embargoes, changes in the sanctions packages have become 
more frequent. In the case of sanctions against states, or individuals targeted in their capacity as state 
leaders, regimes are often tightened so as to reciprocate any aggravation of the policies that gave rise 
to the sanctions, or loosened to reward the targets for concessions. The modulation of the sanctions 
regime requires member states to amend existing regulations or supersede them with new pieces of 
legislation. As suggested by Charron, even a country like Canada, celebrated for its model sanctions 
machinery, can be overwhelmed by the workload resulting from frequent modifications to a growing 
number of sanctions regimes.11 
 
Thirdly, security council resolutions often leave terms undefined. The vagueness or lack of definitions 
of key concepts such as the scope of the items covered under a particular ban, the determination of the 
breach giving rise to the sanctions, or the provisions for humanitarian exceptions results from the need 
to agree on consensual formulations acceptable to all members of the security council. However, this 
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in turn creates a need for the implementing entities to define the terms of the sanctions regime, which 
obstructs the efficacy of measures in two ways. In the first place, it hinders homogeneity. For 
example, the security council did not define “luxury goods” when it imposed sanctions against North 
Korea in 2006 pursuant to resolution 1718. Individual states, therefore, had to decide what 
commodities constituted a luxury good. For the US, this meant performing an unsophisticated Google 
search of the expression “luxury good.” The adoption of increasingly complex measures 
unaccompanied by precise definitions or identifying information is a recipe for increasing 
fragmentation and inefficiency of implementing legislation. A central consideration that compelled 
European Community member states to centralize the implementation of UN sanctions, for example, 
was to enhance the efficacy of the measures through uniform implementation in all member states. 
This solution was seen as preferable to implementation through national legislation, which option had 
resulted in the adoption of “measures of differing content and at different times.”12 
 
A further difficulty is that this situation further delays the process of transposing the resolution into 
domestic legislation, thus aggravating a problem that has characterized the implementation of 
sanctions all along. The employment of blacklist-based measures presents specific problems. 
Sometimes the origin of the delay lies with the security council, which might not release a list to 
accompany the imposing resolution. When it imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on certain targets 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, the security council did not provide a list for a 
year. But even when blacklists are attached to the resolution, the need to transpose all of the decisions 
reflected in the security council resolutions into domestic law gives raise to considerable delays. 
 
From a legal point of view, the trend towards fragmentation appears extremely difficult to reverse. 
While security council resolution 1373 imposes on states the obligation to criminalize the conduct of 
private individuals and entities, it leaves the identification of targeted persons and entities undefined. 
Measures outlined in resolution 1373 are not sanctions but are sanctions like. Gowlland-Debbas 
laments that “this introduces a decentralisation of sanctions decision-making without requiring 
adequate human rights guarantees to be exercised by the implementing member states.”13 Some 
authors have expressed uneasiness about the coexistence of autonomous sanctions imposed by certain 
states in parallel to security council measures because of potential legal difficulties, not least as far as 
judicial review is concerned.14 However, it appears that in view of the configuration of the system in 
place, divergences in implementation are unavoidable. Indeed, Gowlland-Debbas believes that 
“consistency of sanctions implementation across national boundaries is...impossible to achieve.”15 
 
On the other hand, the absence or inadequacy of administrative capacities and expertise at the state 
level is partly alleviated by post-September nth capacity-building.16 Notably, the imposition of 
obligations on UN members to enact legislation criminalizing activities associated with terrorism and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has provided powerful momentum. The security 
council created two working committees, one in 200I pursuant to resolution 1373, which commits 
states to criminalize acts financing international terrorism and to freeze and seize funds used for 
terrorism, and one in 2004 pursuant to resolution 1540, which prescribes the adoption by all states of 
legislation criminalizing activities related to the proliferation of WM D and the establishment of 
domestic controls to prevent the trafficking of sensitive materials. This development has been 
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felicitously accompanied by the willingness of European countries to fund the administrative and 
enforcement capacity-building of states that required it. 
 
 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE: BLACKLISTING AND DUE PROCESS 
 
One of the most notable features of the security council’s practice in the wake of the Cold War is the 
growing degree of encroachment of its enforcement action into the domestic jurisdiction of member 
states. The field of targeted sanctions, which now requires states to criminalize certain actions, is part 
of this development. In recent years, some legal challenges emerged from the adoption of 
implementing legislation in federated entities such as the US and Belgium. However, these cases were 
unrelated to the targeted nature of the sanctions instruments, and the courts invariably ruled in favour 
of the federal level.17 
 
As we shall see, the most serious challenge emerged from the incompatibility between the blacklists 
and general standards of due process guarantees.18 The following discussion provides a brief sketch of 
the consequences relevant to the national implementation of security council sanctions regimes. 
 
Prior to the September nth attacks, but particularly afterwards, the assets freeze and the travel ban list 
that the security council created were extended to a list of individuals identified as financial 
supporters of al Qaeda. The designations, overwhelmingly proposed by the US, often on the basis of 
classified intelligence, were accepted by the other members of the security council in a climate of 
solidarity and determination to combat the terrorist threat. The one check and balance in place has 
been that consensus must be reached for a name to be added or removed from the list. The same 
procedure applies to all subsidiary bodies of the security council, including sanctions committees. 
 
International lawyers immediately identified as problematic the incompatibility between duties 
emanating from security council resolutions and constitutionally protected fundamental rights and 
freedoms.19 Indeed, in 2002, three Swedish citizens protested their listing under resolution 1267. 
Given that they were not able to request their delisting, the Swedish government, exercising 
diplomatic protection, petitioned the security council and filed a request to the 1267 committee, which 
ultimately proved successful. A number of lawsuits over designations were filed in several countries, 
with courts in Pakistan and Turkey ruling in favour of the plaintiffs. As of October 2009, over 30 
legal challenges to the council’s 1267 list have been pursued worldwide.20 
 
Undoubtedly, the legal challenge that has received the most attention is the Kadi judgment of the 
European court of justice of September 2008, which reversed an earlier ruling of the court of first 
instance in 2005. The court of first instance received a complaint from Yassin Abdullah Kadi, the Al 
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Barakaat International Foundation and Ahmed Ali Yusuf, all listed on the 1267 consolidated list 
adopted by the EU in compliance with resolution 1269. They requested that the court annul European 
Community regulation 881, of 27 May 2002, which had brought them within the scope of the 
sanctions. The applicants maintained that the regulation infringed their fundamental rights, in 
particular their right to property, the right to a fair hearing, and the right to an effective judicial 
remedy, as guaranteed by the European convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. After the court of first instance dismissed their request, the judgements were 
appealed. In what has been hailed as a landmark decision, the European court of justice reversed the 
judgements, annulling the implementing regulation.21 
 
In order to justify its dismissal of the claim, the original ruling in 2005 by the court of first instance 
held that the obligations arising from the UN charter prevail over every other obligation of domestic 
law or international treaty law - in accordance with article 103 of the UN charter, which stipulates that 
“in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under 
the present Charter shall prevail.” In other words, the security council’s requirement to freeze the 
assets of the claimants had to supersede human rights concerns. The court only accepted jurisdiction 
in the event that the regulation would violate peremptory norms of international law, or rules of jus 
cogens. Having established that the freezing of funds mandated by the EC regulation was not relevant 
to peremptory law, the court declined jurisdiction and ruled against these claims.22 
 
The argument that measures taken in implementation of security council resolutions should enjoy 
immunity from judicial review was contested by Advocate General Polares Maduro in his opinion of 
January 2008.23 He argued that the court should not confine its scrutiny to the violation of peremptory 
law, but should apply its normal judicial standards to the protection of fundamental human rights. In 
accordance with this argument, the European court of justice ruled that the community judiciary must 
ensure the review of the lawfulness of all community acts in the light of protected fundamental rights, 
including the review of community measures designed to give effect to council resolutions. On this 
basis, the court found a violation of the right to be heard and the right to effective judicial review. It 
confirmed previous jurisprudence, affirming that the principle of effective judicial protection requires 
communicating the grounds for being included on the blacklist. Thus, the lack of communication of 
the evidence against the appellants violated the right to be heard. As this prevented the court from 
reviewing the lawfulness of the listing, it was considered a breach of the right to effective legal 
remedy. 
 
Neither court accepted that international law requires that the UN charter take precedence over EC 
law. Specifically, the European court of justice stated that “a constitutional guarantee stemming from 
the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system” cannot “be prejudiced by an international 
agreement.”24 Although the ruling resolves a situation that had been widely resented as unsatisfactory 
for protection of fundamental rights,25 the court of justice has been criticized for undermining the 
binding force of international obligations, as the ruling suggests that “within the Community they may 
only be implemented and enforced if properly authorised by the Community legal system,” while it 
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falls short of explaining how this notion can be reconciled with its concomitant claim that the 
“Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers.”26 The ruling has thus been 
criticized for performing a judicial review of the security council mandated measure: by overturning 
the most important findings of the court of first instance, the court of justice established “a fully- 
fledged, yet indirect fundamental rights review vis-à-vis Security Council resolutions.” 
 
However, some important considerations are in place in connection with these criticisms. Firstly, the 
European court of justice made a distinction between the review of the legality of an international 
agreement and the measures intended to give effect to the international agreement. The judgement 
argues that the annulment of a community measure intended to give effect to an international law 
measure does not entail any challenge to the primacy of that measure in the international legal order: 
“it is not for the Community judicature... to review the lawfulness of such a resolution adopted by an 
international body.”27 Instead, the court maintains that council resolutions are to be given effect in 
accordance with the procedure applicable in the domestic legal order of each member of the United 
Nations. Hence, it reaffirms that it is the judicial review of the internal lawfulness of the domestic act 
implementing the council resolution that falls within its jurisdiction. This reading is consistent with 
the jurisprudence of the European court of human rights, which held in its judgement in Bosphorus 
that when a contracting party has taken steps to implement a council resolution in its legal order, such 
measures are attributable to that party and are therefore amenable to review.28 By invalidating the 
ruling, the court of justice seized “a golden opportunity to bring a step further the proclaimed 
‘constitutionalisation’ and autonomy of the Community legal system.”29 This idea also corresponds to 
the understanding exhibited by the security council, which mandated in resolution 1624 that “states 
must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism (pursuant to resolution 1373) comply with 
all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with 
international law, in particular human rights.”30 
 
A second consideration relates to the court of justice’ s implicit concession that the reexamination 
procedure before the 1267 sanctions committee could potentially benefit from a limited form of 
immunity from judicial review within the European Community legal order if it offered adequate 
protection for fundamental rights.31 Mirroring the “Solange” jurisprudence of the German federal 
court - entailing a conditional renunciation of the review of fundamental rights as long as they are 
protected by the European court of justice -- Maduro affirmed the court’s jurisdiction “only to the 
extent and so long as the UN did not organise a judicial or quasi-judicial system of review of the 
decisions of the Sanctions Committee.”32 
 
In fact, the conduct of the court of justice in this case can be seen to be aiming at the preservation of 
its own jurisdiction, established for itself as European integration progressed. The principal 
motivation behind the court’s embrace of fundamental rights as part of the community’s legal order in 
the early days of European integration was the preservation of the primacy of EC law over the 
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domestic laws of the member states.33 In this light, the court of justice’s reversal of the original ruling 
can be regarded as a decision taken in the spirit of “self-preservation.” 
 
 
 
TOWARDS FURTHER FRAGMENTATION? 
 
What are the implications for the implementation of UN sanctions at the domestic level? The most 
immediate effect of the legal challenges, and particularly of the rulings in favour of the plaintiffs, has 
been a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of UN member states, and broadly speaking the general public. 
This has translated into a growing reticence by some governments to name individuals to the list. 
According to a UN report, more than 50 member states have expressed reservations about the lack of 
due process and absence of transparency in listing and delisting procedures.34 Aware of the threat to 
the legitimacy of its measures and the decline in support for their effective implementation that this 
might entail, the council has gradually adopted a number of improvements to its listing and delisting 
procedures. These were later complemented by the formulation of guidelines governing the 
committee’s working methods, the establishment of a requirement to notify individuals of their listing, 
and the creation of a focal point in the UN secretariat - an officer in charge of receiving petitions for 
delisting. However, despite these endeavours, current listing and delisting procedures are still 
considered by human rights lawyers largely insufficient to meet due process standards.35 The UN 
special rapporteur, Martin Scheinin, has defined the minimum requirements to ensure a fair hearing as 
entailing: 
 
the right of an individual to be informed of the measures taken and to know the case against 
him... the right to be heard... by the relevant decision-making body; the right to effective 
review by a competent and independent review mechanism; the right to counsel with respect 
to all proceedings; and the right to an effective remedy.36 
 
Yet the most evident consequence of the European court of justice ruling is the dissolution of the idea 
initially espoused by the court of first instance that courts have only limited jurisdiction to review the 
validity of measures when these implement UN law obligations due to reluctance to “indirectly 
review... the lawfulness of the underlying United Nations Security Council Resolution.”37 Now that it 
has been clearly established, at least at the European level, that courts are to have full jurisdiction, 
national legislators can be expected to exercise extreme caution in ensuring that fundamental rights 
are protected under their respective legal systems when enacting sanctions legislation. This is bound 
to have a noticeable impact on the transposition of sanctions measures, both in terms of timing and the 
scope of the implementing legislation. Conscious of the delicate nature of the measures, legislators are 
likely to take more time to draft implementing legislation more carefully. When unconvinced by the 
supporting evidence for blacklisting certain individuals, they might seek additional information, 
which might be complicated to obtain or may not be disclosed due to its confidential nature. Under 
these circumstances, one can easily picture a situation in which blacklists are implemented 
“selectively” by choosing to impose measures only on certain individuals whose connection to 
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terrorism activities is unequivocal, rather than on the whole list. This state of affairs is likely to 
exacerbate the problems already identified above: that of the time lag between the adoption of the 
blacklist by the security council and the growing heterogeneity of implementing instruments across 
member states. 
 
As the protection of fundamental rights varies from country to country, the implementing legislation 
of council resolutions might differ too. As Gattini has aptly put it, 
 
on the one hand, one cannot but welcome the unbending commitment of the European Court 
of Justice to the respect of fundamental human rights, but on the other hand the relatively high 
price, in terms of coherence and unity of the international legal system... is worrying.38 
 
Still, much will depend on the course that the council eventually chooses to secure fair procedures. A 
straightforward option would consist in taking up the challenge of profoundly revising its procedures. 
Regretting that the latest adjustments introduced by security council resolution 1822 are still 
insufficient for meeting the fairly demanding standards spelled out in the Kadi judgement, Scheinin 
called for the establishment of a mechanism of independent review at the UN level in the form of a 
quasi -judicial review body composed of independent security-classified experts, suggesting that this 
“would be likely to be recognized by national courts, the EU courts and regional human rights 
courts.”39 Broadly speaking, two alternatives are contemplated. One of them would maintain the 
current system unaltered, whereby blacklists are agreed to at the level of the security council and 
review is provided at the national level. While this option would most likely lead to increased 
litigation, judicial review at the national level could be considerably facilitated by provision of the 
grounds for listing individuals and entities “so that the person or entity may be informed of those 
reasons and will be able to contest the implementation of the listing before national courts and the EU 
court.” A second possibility would involve abolishing the 1267 committee and leaving responsibility 
for the drafting of listings to individual governments, similar to the 1373 requirement. But would this 
result in any blacklisting, especially by other states? Neither alternative seems a solution to further 
fragmentation. This thus leaves the creation of a quasi-judicial review body along the lines sketched 
by Scheinin as the only option capable of stemming growing heterogeneity in the national 
implementation of UN sanctions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding analysis reveals conflicting trends in the field of national implementation of UN 
sanctions. A number of obstacles make the internationally homogeneous and speedy implementation 
of sanctions appear to be an unattainable goal. Part of the problem is connected to the domestic 
regulations governing the transposition of international obligations into national legislation. The 
fragmentation of the national implementation of resolutions is exacerbated by the ambiguity displayed 
in the language of security council resolutions, increasingly intrusive in the domestic competences of 
member states, but often too vague to provide effective guidance for their implementation. 
 
Recent developments in due process have proved encouraging with regard to the protection of 
individual rights, although they are hardly promising in terms of their potential to smooth sanctions 
implementation. This development must not be viewed as detrimental to efficacy. The Kadi ruling 
might well function as a wake -up call, encouraging the security council to revise its delisting 
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procedures substantially. While earlier recommendations in this direction were ignored and the 
council has been slow in responding to pressure, the loss of legitimacy and the ensuing weakening of 
state obligations to comply with council mandates are likely to compel it to take the recommendations 
more seriously. The benefits that could be gained from improving due process do not lie principally, 
or immediately, in the optimization of the efficacy of the measures. Yet an increase in security council 
legitimacy, as well as the enhanced protection of fundamental rights, will eventually, albeit indirectly, 
contribute to its effectiveness. Conversely, the most preoccupying feature of current council practice 
is the circumvention of established standards in due process in the absence of any apparent gain to the 
efficacy of the measures. 
 
